Jean Sinclair v. John W. Turner, Warden, Utah State Prison : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1967
Jean Sinclair v. John W. Turner, Warden, Utah State
Prison : Brief of Respondent
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Warren M. Weggeland; Attorney for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Sinclair v. Turner, No. 10768 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3936
. ._.t 
Of, .•.. ·'···.~ ' . ' - ~-'4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE________________________ 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL --------------------------------···· 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ... --·-·----------------------------------·---- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY CON-
CLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT 
DENIED A FAIR TRIAL OR DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW. ·-----·-----···----------·--·--·--·-·------------· 10 
CONCLUSION __ ---------·------------------------------------------------------· 36 
APPENDIX --·················--········------····----·-·····--·······-·····---······-39 
Cases Cited 
Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 8 L.Ed. 2d 98, 82 S.Ct. 
955, reh. den. 370 U.S. 965, B L.Ed. 2d 834, 82 S.Ct. 
1575 (1962) ···--···----··-·-····---···----·······-··············-······-···25, 26 
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 91 L.Ed. 1546, 67 S.Ct. 
1249 (1947) ··-················-··········-·-··················-·············· 11 
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 352, 14 L.Ed. 2d 543, 85 S.Ct. 
1628 (1965) -···-·-····---···---··----··--·········--····-·-·····-····11, 31, 34 
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 30 L.Ed. 709 ( 1887) ............ 23 
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 6 L.Ed. 2d 751, 81 S.Ct. 
1639 ( 1961) --- ·---··-·--······-···········--····-····-·-·······-·········-11, 24 
TABLE OF CONTF:NTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963) 24 
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 3 L.Ed. 2d 
1250, 79 S.Ct. 1171 (1959) ------------------------ ________ ______ 11 
McGuffey v. Turner, ________ Utah 2d ________ , 432 P.2d 166 
( 1967) --------- ----- --- ---- ---- ---- --······---·---- -- --- ---- --------- --- --------- - 26 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1930) _ _ 3<', 
Reizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1962) 
cert. den. 371 U.S. 890, 9. L.Ed. 2d 123, 83 S.Ct. 
188 (1962) ---------------------------· ------------------------------------··· 25 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 
( 1879) --··- ··-------···-·····--·-·--------·-···-····-·----·-····---·--·-··--·---· 28 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600 
(1966) -····-··---·--------·-·-------------··--------·-·---11, 12, 27, 31, 36 
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964) 30 
Strobel v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 96 L.Ed. 872, 72 S.Ct. 
599 (1952) ····-----------------··-·-------------··--·----------------------- 22 
Theide v. Utah, 159 U.S. 510, 40 L.Ed. 237 (1895) ____ __ 23 
United States ex rel., Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 100 
L.Ed. 1331, 76 S.Ct. 965 (1956) ·····-····-······-·········· 24 
United States v. Synodinos, 218 F. Supp. 479 (DC Utah 
1963) ·····-····-·------·-·--····· · ·····-········································ 25 
Workman v. Turner, ________ Utah 2d ________ , 425 P.2d 402 
( 1967) ----· ----·-···--·-·-····---- ----- --- ---- ---·· ··----- -- --· -·--- --- ---- -·---· ~6 
Constitution Cited 
U.S. Const. amend. I ---------·---- _ __ __ __ ___ _ ___ ___________ ___ 3·1 
U.S. Const. amend. V ____________ ___________ _ ___________________________ 34 
U.S. Const. amend. VI ____ ____ ___________ _______ ___________ _ 31 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV _____ ___ ________ _ __________ ___ ______ __ _ 34 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-28 (1953) __ ______ ___________ ________ '.21 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Texts Cited 
American Bar Association, Reardon Report, Fair Trial 
and Free Press, (1966) ____________________________________________ 31, 32 
Annot., 31 A.L.R. 2d 417 ---------------------------------- _________________ 24 
Annot., 3 L.Ed. 2d 1250 ---------------------------------------------------- 2·1 
Annot., 10 L.Ed. 2d 1243 ------------------------------------------------25, 26 
Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1966) ----------------·· 32 
Journal of the National District Attorney's Association, 
Vol. 1, No. 2 (1965) ---------------------------------------------------- 32 
Medina, Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial 
(1967) ------------------------------------------- ______________________ 28, 32, 33 
Medina, Interim Report on Radio and Television ( 1965) 32 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JEAN SINCLAIR, 
Pe ti tioner-Appellan t, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TURNER, 
Warden, Utah State Prison, 
Respondent-Respondent. 
Case No. 
10768 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Jean Sinclair, appeals from the 
denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the Third Judi-
cial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Hearing was held on appellant's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus on the 28th day of October, 
1966, before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, District 
Judge of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
following which the writ was denied and the ap-
pellant remanded back to the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court denying the petition 
for writ of habeas corpus be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent fundamentally agrees with the 
chronology of events as recited in the statement of 
facts submitted in appellant's brief, but disagrees 
with the remainder of the statement of facts as sub-
mitted by appellant. Accordingly, respondent offers 
the following c.s a more detailed and accurate state-
ment of evidence and facts connected with this 
matter. 
Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake County c1n 
the 9th day of June, 1966, alleging: (1) publicity 
thrmigh the various news media published prior to 
and during the appellant's trial was prejudicial, de 
privinq her of a right to a fair and impartial trial, 
(2) supression of evidence by the State favorable to 
appellant, (3) the State knowingly employed false 
testimony during the trial, (4) failure of the jury to 
comply with the court's instructions, (5) appellan1 
was denied the right to confront witnessess claim· 
ing the jury received information outside the court-
room, and (6) appellant was denied the right to fully 
cross-examine a witness of the State. 
The appellant had previously been convictrd 
of first degree murder in the death of Don L. foster. 
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ond upon the jury's recommendation of leniency, 
was sentenced to life inprisonment on May 4, 1963. 
On October 28, 1966, a hearing was had in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County before the 
Honorable A. H. Ellett on appellant's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. 
Andrew F. Wahlquist appeared as the first wit-
ness for appellant and testified that during the pe-
riod of arrest and trial of the appellant, he was em-
ployed by a local television station as its news 
editor. He testified that he did take some movinq 
pictures of the appellant in a hallway at the court-
house while appellant was in custody (R-27). He 
stated that he took no pictures of the members of 
the jury (R-27) except at that time when the jury was 
visiting the scene of the crime (R-28). He testified he 
took no pictures of witness testifying at the trial 
m-27) and specifically did not take any photographs 
of Carl Kuehne or a LaRae Peterson, both "key" 
vritnesses at the trial (R-27). He stated further that 
before he took any pictures, he asked the trial judge 
for permission to do so and received permission to 
take pictures as long as the court was not in session 
(R-31, 32). He stated further that some of the film he 
took was later broadcast by the television station 
for which he was employed (R-33). When ques-
tioned about the number of news media representa-
tives present during the course of the trial, Mr. Wahl-
quist stated that there were reporters from each of 
the two local newspapers and the three local tele-
vision stations for a total of five. 
James Warren Monroe testified for appellant 
that during the period in question he was employed 
by a local television and radio station (R-35), that he 
took moving pictures of the appellant on the da.y of 
her arrest when she was taken from a police ve 
hic1o into the police station (R-36), which film was 
shown that same evening by his employer. He 
stated that he photographed crowds outside the 
courtroom, that he assumed the jurors would be in 
the pictures of the crowds, but none of the jurors 
were identified (R-43). He stated that he did not 
photograph the witnesses Keuhne or Peterson (R-43, 
44). 
Art Kent, Jr., testified for appellant that he was 
the news manager of KUTV during the period in 
question, that at that time there were approximate-
ly twenty thousand homes in the metropolitan SalL 
Lake viewing area which would constitute the esti-
mated television coverage of his station (R-46, 47) 
In response to a question concerning what partic-
ular aspect of the trial Mr. Kent commented on dur-
ing his news casts, he replied: 
If I may, Mr. Mitsunaga, may I say "comment" is 
not necessarily the correct term in this case. I think 
"report" would be a better term .... 
"Comment" implies opinion, and there was no 
opinion expressed. As I recall, we covered the case 
from its inception to its conclusion with periodic 
and routine reports of facts as they happened and 
events as the:v happened. (R-49) 
David John Parr, also an employee of KUT'! 
testified for appellant that he was a reporter for thar 
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television station during the period in question. He 
stated that he took some moving picture film of the 
scene of the crime on the night of the crime, a_ppel-
lant's arrest and her arraignment (R-51). He stated 
he took pictures of the appellant when she was 
brought to the courthouse from the jail (R-57), that 
he photographed the jurors inspecting the scene 
of the crime (R-58), that he did not photograph the 
jury as they were entering or leaving the courtroom 
(R-58), and that, in his opinion, KUTV did not give 
more air time to the Sinclair matter than to other 
homicide trials (H-58). He stated that any pictures 
made inside the courtroom were with the consent 
of the defense counsel and the judge (R-51). In re-
sponse to a question from the court, Mr. Parr stated 
that he had no knowledge of any community reputa-
tion for violence by the public toward people 
accused of crime (R-51), nor of any public animosity 
with respect or regard to homosexuality (R-62). He 
also stated that the homosexual overtones connect-
ed with the Sinclair case were not a factor in the 
amount of publicity connected with the case (R-65). 
Testifying as to the causes for the publicity that 
did exist prior to and during the Sinclair trial, Art 
Kent stated that aside from the fact that Miss Sin-
clair was charged with first degree murder, other 
factors tha.t might have been inovlved were that it 
was a slow news day when the crime took place, 
that crimes of violence attract more attention than 
other crimes, the manner by which the crime was 
committed, and the fact that the accused was a 
woman (R-66, 67). 
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Vard Stanley Jones testified for appellant that 
during the period in question he was a reporter for 
the Salt Lake Tribune, a local newspaper. He testi-
fied that during the course of the trial he atterideri 
each day (7-70), that the circulation of the Salt Lake 
Tribunte was between 109,000 and 115,000 (R-73). He 
stated that the length of the trial had an effect 011. 
the amount of news coverage given to the par+ic11lN 
case, that if it had elements of interest to the public, 
the interest increased; that this case had an element 
of sensation about it by reason of the way the mur-
der v11a.s committed and the circumstances surround-
ing it. and that there were homosexual overtones 
as brought out by trial testimony (R-75). He stated 
further that there were no journalists or reporters 
of national reoutation or stature (R-79), that the Salt 
Lake Tribune did not have a photographer stationed 
outside the courtroom, that there were no featurs 
articles of any of the jurors, nor any photographs of 
any juror published in the Salt Lake Tribune (R-80). 
Donald D. Beck testified that during the period 
in question he was a court and crime reporter fer: 
the Deseret News, a local newspaper. He stated that 
at the time copies of police reports were distributed 
by the Salt Lake City Police Department to members 
of the press corps assigned to the police beat, con-
taining the nature of the crime, when the arrest wos 
made, statistical information, location of the crime: 
that no confidential information was distributed to 
the press corps (R-84). He stated that he reported th:-· 
testimony as it developed at trial (R-86, 87). 
7 
He stated a photograph of witnesses was taken 
after they had testified (R-91), that there were no 
photographs of the jury when it visited the scene 
of the crime (R-91), and that he did not project any 
testimony until it had been brought out in the trial 
(R-93). 
Harry Clark was called to testify for appellant 
and stated that at the time in question he was the 
bailiff assigned to the trial judge. He described the 
location of the press table inside the bar, and the 
location of additional spectators' chairs that were 
placed inside the bar (R-95, 97). He stated that the 
spectators chairs inside the bar were only for at-
torneys, law students, journalists, and student 
journalists (R-97). He also stated that the courtroom 
was qenerally filled to capacity with spectators. He 
testified that he did not observe any representatives 
of the television media taking pictures inside the 
courtroom nor any photographs taken of the partici-
pants of the trial inside the courtroom (R-100). He 
stated that there was at least a space of three feet 
between the feet 0£ the spectators inside the bar 
and the chairs located at the counsel table (R-101). 
He further stated that a loud speaker system was in-
stalled in the trial courtroom because a State's wit-
ness claimed to be suffering from a severe case of 
laryngitis (R-102). 
Sumner Hatch, defense counsel for appellam 
at trial, testified as to incidents of movie cameras 
Photographing Mr. Hatch and the appellant at the 
reading of the verdict or sentence (R-115). A motion 
fur mistrial was made (R-116). He stated also that a 
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magazine was found on the floor under a spectator's 
chair inside the bar, and that the cover of the maga-
zine was in plain view (R-117). He stated further that 
while the jury was entering or leaving the court- , 
room he overheard conversation with regard to 
homosexuality involving the defendant (R-119), but 
that he could not say whether the jurors were close 
enough to hear the conversation (R-120). Mr. Hatch 
testified that he did not move for a mistrial because 
of crowded courtroom conditions, that he made no 
motion for a mistrial because of television pictures 
being taken, that he did not protest each time pic-
tures were taken (R-120). He did protest picture tai:-
ing initially on the first day, did make a motion for a 
mistrial when moving pictures were being taken 
for television at the time of sentence (R-120, 121). 
Officer Glen Cahoon of the Salt Lake Ciiy 
Police Department testified for appellant that certain 
police raports may have been disseminated to the 
press corps, but that no statement of witnesses wern 
shown to the press regarding the Sinclair case CR-
127). He stated further that the magazine story ap-
pearing in the national publication (P-7) was 
distorted (R-128). 
Counsel stipulated as to the existence of the 
magazine articles appearing in three nationally 
distributed mago.zines, which articles carried storit:?2 
involving the Don Foster murder. The magazines 
were offered into evidence as proposed petitioner', 
Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, but were not udmitted into PV 
dence. Counsel further stiplated as to the circula· 
tion in the Salt LakP nren. of propos,-:>d Exhibits p.·i 
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at 675-700, P-8 at 250, and P-9 at 490. In refusing to 
admit proposed Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, the trial court 
indicated that they would be made available to the 
Utah Supreme Court (R-131, 132). 
Robert E. Nielsen testified for appellant. He 
stated that he was a juror during the Sinclair tridl 
(R-133). He stated that going to and from the jury box 
he did not overhear any of the conversation of the 
spectators concerning the case or of personalities 
involved in the case (R-134). With respect to pro-
posed Exhibit P-7, he testified that the first time he 
had seen that magazine was at 1:30 p.m. that partic-
ular day (October 28, 1966) (R-135). The witness fur-
ther testified that he did not hear any conversation 
regarding homosexuality. from any of the spectators 
during the course of the trial (R-136). 
Appellant's next witness was Elroy Nielsen. He 
testified that he was a spectator at the Sinclair trial 
(R-138). He stated that during the course of the trial 
he did not see a copy of the magazine designated as 
P-7 (R-138), nor did he overhear any conversation 
reqarding homosexuality made in the presence of 
the jurors (R-138). 
Other witnesses were called by appellant, in· 
eluding Eunice Carpenter, a matron of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office, and Richard C. Dibblee, the 
chief criminal deputy, Salt Lake County Attorney 
· t the time the homicide complaint was filed against 
Miss Sinclair. Their testimony will not be referred 
to by the respondent. 
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It should be pointed out that most of the wlt-
nesses for the appellant testified to the conditions 
of the courtroom, the large number of spectators, 
and the existance of a table inside the bar for per-
sonnel of the news media. 
Counsel stipulated that reporters for the various 
news media covered the trial, that they took sornc; 
pictures, and they wrote stories about the trial for 
their papers or news accounts for their television 
stations. The stipulation was broadened to include 
the time of arrest, the preliminary hearing, and the 
trial (R-45). It should be pointed out, however, tha.t 
the press were excluded in the preliminary heal-
ing (R-86). 
Films shown over local television stations were 
shown to the court during the hearing on appel-
lant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. AdmitleC 
into evidence were newscast scripts, news accounts 
published in the Salt Lake Tribune and news cw 
counts published in the Deseret News. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYIN(; 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS BY CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS 
NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL OR DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
Appellant seeks her release and discharge fron; 
the Utah State Prison primarily on the ground that 
publicity prior to and during her trial deprived her 
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of ,) f dir and impartial trial. Appellant also claims 
that certain influences in the courtroom were dis-
ruptive, thereby depriving her of a fair trial. Re-
spondent will first examine the appellant's claim 
with regard to prejudicial publicity. 
Prejudicial nevvs reporting is a very vague and 
fluid concept, but since it is the standard currently 
used by the courts, an attempt must be made to de-
fine lt. Since all news concerning the investigation 
of a crime and the trial of criminal cases is not to 
be criticized or suppressed, the courts have been 
c~inc2rned with that which is prejudicial to the rights 
of ti.ie defendant to have a fair trial. Recent cases in 
pm-~·J determining that the right of the accused were 
vioL~ted are Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 352, 14 L.Ed 2d 
543, 85 S.Ct. 1628 (1965), Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U. S. 333, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1966), Marshall v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 310, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1250, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 
(1959), and Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 6 L.Ed. 2d 
751, 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961). In each of these cases thE': 
United States Supreme Court found fundamental 
error of such gravity as to set aside the conviction 
of the persons involved on the grounds of prejudi-
Cldl news publicity and improper jury conduct. 
However, neither the United States Supreme 
Court, nor this court, has been willing to place any 
:l;rect limitation on the freedom traditionally exer-
cL~ed by the news media upon the theory that "what 
transpires in the courtroom is public property." See 
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 91 L.Ed. 154G, 
l'JSl, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947). Indeed, there is nothing 
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that proscribes the press from reportinCJ events that 
transpire in the courtroom. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
op. cit. 16 L.Ed. 2d at 620. 
The question then becomes, and the issue 
squarely before this court is, in what way did the 
reporting of the Sinclair trial (Don Foster's murder) 
endanger the proper functioning of the criminr.l 
process and, in particular, jeopardize the right of 
Miss Sinclair to a fair and impartial trial? 
An examination must be made of the publici1y 
in the Sinclair case on the basis of pre-trial publicity 
and on the basis of publicity during the trial. 
As to pre-trial publicity, the record reveals the 
Salt Lake Tribune. January 20, 1953, printed a story 
]nvolving the arrest and jailing of Miss Sinclair for 
first degree murder. The article relates that Miss Sin-
clair was arrested in connection with the "ambush 
shotgun slaying" of a Salt Lake service station opera-
tor. The article further relates that evidence was pre-
sented to the County Attorney's office and a com-
plaint issued. The article carried a photograph of 
Miss Sinclair in custody of two Salt Lake police of-
ficers. The articles states that Captain Fillis, plain-
clothes division commander, declined to make any 
comment on the evidence "other than that it was 
sufficient to obtain a first degree murder complaint." 
The article further quotes Captain Fillis as stating 
that the Foster murder is " ... the most bizarre mur-
der case that I have ever been involved in." (P-5) 
Pre-trial publicity over local television station 
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include the first account on January 5, 1962, where-
in the murder of Don Foster was described. 
Subsequent television coverage includes a 
statement that Miss Sinclair had been charged wHh 
first degree murder on the afternoon of January 19, 
1963. The news account includes a film of Miss Sin-
clair, an account of the murder of Don Foster, and 
the statement that "Captain Fillis had no comment 
on any points of evidence gathered by the police 
department. Miss Sinclair will be arraigned on the 
murder charges Monday morning, before City Judge 
J. Patton Neeley. She is being held without bail." 
On January 20, 1963, the television script indi-
cated: 
A forty-five year old woman will be arrainged on 
murder charges tomorrow morning in city court. 
Jean Sinclair was charged yesterday in connection 
with an ambush shot gun slaying of Don Leroy 
Foster on January 5. The woman was arrested by 
City detectivE:s in her home in South Salt Lake. 
Television news coverage on January 21, 1963, 
includes a recitation that Miss Sinclair was arraigned 
in Salt Lake City Court on charges of first degroe 
murder. It recites the fact that she was arrested on 
the previous Saturday for the "shotgun slaying of a 
th\rty-three year old Don Leroy Foster while he was 
qetting out of his car in front of the Susan Kay Apart-
ments here in Salt Lake." The story further recounts 
the fact that, 
Although Miss Sinclair, a nursing home operator 
lw.<l been held without bail since her arrest on Sat-
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nn1ay, Judge Stewart M. Hansen of the Third 
District Court, today set bail at $20,000. Later to-
day Miss Sinclair was released from the county jail 
after bail had been posted for her. 
Mrs. LaRay Peterson, of Kearns, the companion of 
the shotgun victim, Don Leroy Foster, had told 
Sergeant Glen Cahoon, of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, that she did not see the attacker the 
night of the shooting. 
However, Mrs. Peterson does admit to an acquaint-
ance with the suspect Miss Sinclair .... 
The fact that the preliminary examination had 
commenced was also reported by the television 
media. February 20, 1963, it was reported that the , 
exclusion rule barring press and spectators from 
the courtroom had been invoked by the defense 
counsel, that the State presented three witnesses 
for the prosecution, and the defense presented three 
witnesses. 
February 28, 1963, Miss Sinclair was bound over 
to the District Court to stand trial for first degree 
murder. This was reported by local television. 
Along with the report that Miss Sinclair had been 
bound over was the fact that Mrs. LaRae Peterson, i 
a previous witness during the preliminary exam-
ination, was being recalled to the witness stand. 
The script states: 
... and she felt she was entitled to legal counsel. 
An exclusion rule had been invoked at the request 
of the defense, only those directly concerned with 
the hearing were admitted. 
Nevertheless, Mrs. Peterson's attorney, Jim Mit-
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sunaga, appeared in city court and was promptly 
ordered out by Judge Neeley. 
Mr. Mi tsunaga petitioned District Judge Steward 
Hanson for a writ of mandamus, to force Judge 
Neeley to admit him. 
Judge Stewart (Hanson) issued a temporary writ, 
and an order to Judge Neeley to show cause why 
the writ should not be made permanent. 
.Judge Neeley responded rapidly ... he recessed the 
court, and went up to the third floor to show cause 
to Judge Hanson. 
After hearing Judge Neeley, and after the defense 
refused to waive the exclusion rule, the writ was 
denied by Judge Hanson. 
And attorney Mitsunaga remained outside .... 
Late this afternoon, Jud;::e Marcellus K. Snow or-
dered Miss Sinclair held without bail in the county 
jail, until her district court trial was completed. 
After long arguments before the judge, Miss Sinclair 
was booked into the jail and her $20,000 bail re-
voked. 
The 10 o'clock news on the same day, February 
28, was essentially a recap of the previous story. On 
March 4, television media carried the following 
story: 
Forty-five year old Jean Sinclair was to have been 
arraigned in District Court on charges of first de-
gree murder. 
Salt Lake City Judge J. Patton Neeley had sug-
gested last Thursday that Miss Sinclair be arraigned 
today and she was bound over to the District Court. 
Upon the request of Attorney Jay Banks, arraign-
ment was set for next Monday at 10 o'clock in the 
morning. 
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Miss Sinclair was charged with the .January 5 shot-
gun slaying of Don Leroy Foster in Salt Lake City. 
Judge Marcellus K. Snow allowed the continuation 
and will handle the arraignment next Monday. 
Although the record reflects there was som0 
publicity connected with the murder of Don Foster, 
the arrest of appellant, her arraignment and pre 
liminary examination, respondent submits that in no 
instance was any of the pretrial publicity in any way 
prejudicial to the rights of the accused. 
Respondent submits that at any time there is c_ 
shotgun assassination in the parking lot of a public 
apartment complex, that such murder will be con-
sidered newsworthy by the news media and will 
command substantial news coverage. Once a crime 
of violence of this type occurs in a community, the 
public demands to know what is being done by its 
local law enforcement agencies. As was pointed 
out by the SpeciaJ Committee on Radio, Television 
and the Administration of Justice of the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York in its Final Reporl 
with Recommendations on Freedom of the Press 
and Fair Trial, Judge Harold R Medina, chairman, a: 
page 28: 
... The police are rnquired by the community to 
demonstrate constantly and concretely their capa-
city to fulfill their responsibilities, among which the 
protection of society from criminal conduct ranks 
foremost. Specifically, when crimes of violence 
occur, in particular those of murder, assault, rape. 
and robbery, creating widespread apprehension and 
at times holding the community in a grip of terror. 
the public demands to know what is being done to 
apprehend the perpetrator. 
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Respondent submits that the pretrial publicity 
given to the Foster murder and the subsequent ar-
rest and preliminary examination of Jean Sinclair 
was the result of the public's demand to know that 
the local law enforcement agency was hard at work 
to maintain peace and order in the community. The 
publication by the press and other news media of 
the arrest of Miss Sinclair, that a complaint had been 
filed charging her with first degree murder, and the 
subsequent reporting by the news media of the 
results of the preliminary examination were the only 
items reported by the press during the pre-trial pe-
riod. The account in the Salt Lake Tribune was quick 
to point out that Captain Fillis refused to comment 
on any of the evidence (P-5). In none of the televi-
sion reports was there any comment upon any of 
the evidence but merely recaps of the fact that 
Foster had been killed by a shotgun, that Sinclair 
had been charged, a brief background of Sinclair 
to effect that she was a nursing home operator, 
the location of the murder, and related items of 
background material which in no way could be con-
sidered prejudicial to the appellant. 
Examining the publicity that occurred during 
the course of the appellant's trial, television cov-
erage commenced April 15, 1963, with the comment 
that, "Another first degree murder trial opened in 
Third District Court today, this time involving a Salt 
Lake nursing home operator." The television script 
reports the charge, and that the court action of that 
first day was primarily confined to the selection o:t 
c1 jury. It opined that the trial would be lengthy, 
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with "38 witnesses subpoened by the State alone." 
The script indicates that the public would not be 
excluded from the trial as they were during the pre-
liminary hearing. 
On April 16, television script reports the second 
day of the murder trial of appellant. The openinq 
statement of the District Attorney was reported: 
District Attorney Banks said Miss Sinclair and Mrs. 
LaRae Peterson had carried on an intimate rela-
tionship ... and that this was threatened by Mr. 
Foster. 
He said the State's evidence will show that the de-
fendant had planned for some time to murder 
Foster, and that she had admitted the killing less 
than an hour after it had occurred the night of Jan-
uary 5. 
Defense counsel Sumner J. Hatch challenged the 
State to prove his client guilty ... and said he 
would produce evidence that would convict the 
State's star witness of the shotgun killing. He said 
his client has an alibi for the time the killing took 
place. 
On April 17, local television reported the ex-
amination by the jury of the scene of the crime and 
recapped the opening statements of the District At· 
torney and defense counsel. 
On April 18, the coverage continued with the 
recap of the testimony of Carl Kuehne. In the script 
Kuehne testified he, 
. . . bought the alleged murder weapon, and ha<l 
talked to Miss Sinclair about killing 33 year old 
Donald Leroy Foster. 
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On April 19, the television coverage was limited 
to 25 seconds with the following script, no film: 
Witnesses for the prosecution continued to testify 
today in the first degree murder trial of Jean Sin-
clair. The S'llt Lake resident Vaughn Humphreys 
testified he broh off his friendship with the de-
fendant after learning of the plot to kill Don Leroy 
Foster. 
Mrs. LaRae Peterson, a divorcee, who was with 
Foster the night he was shotgunned to death, testi-
fied she was acquainted with the defendant prior 
to the slaying. 
Subsequent to April 19, through the end of the 
trial, local television gave the trial continued cov-
erage on the following dates, for the following times, 
and in some instances showing film as indicated, 
generally restating the charges against Miss Sin-
clair and recapping testimony as it was admitted 
during the trial: 
April 22 (film) 1 minute 5 seconds 6 o'clock news 
April 22 " " " " " 10 " " 
April 23 " 52 seconds 6 " " 
April 23 " " " 10 " " 
April 24 " 1 minute 6 " " 
April 24 " 58 seconds 10 " " 
April 29 " 53 seconds 6 " " 
April 29 " " " 10 " " 
April 30 (no film) 30 seconds 6 " " 
May 1 (film) 45 seconds 10 " " 
May 2 " 1 minute 15 seconds 10 " " 
May 3 " 1 minute 10 " " 
May 4 " 2 minutes 10 seconds 10 " " 
May 6 
May 13 
May 29 
20 
seconds 6 
50 seconds 10 
(no film) 75 
(no film) 
(film) 1 minute 30 seconds 6 
" 
" 
" " 
Closing arguments were reported on the lD 
o'clock news on May 2, showing a film, the cov-
erage lasting one minute fifteen sec(mds. Both side; 
rested May 2. On May 3, television reported the jury 
still out, showing film coverage lasting one minute 
Coverage on May 4, reported the jury verdict oi 
first degree murder, showing film, coverage la::·t 
ing two minutes ten seconds. On May 6, television 
reported that sentence would be delayed for Miss 
Sinclair for a period of one week_ No film was shown 
coverage lasting twenty-five seconds. On May 11, 
film coverage showed Miss Sinclair's sentencinc; 
postponed agc:dn, coverage lasting fifty seconds 
May 29, 6 o'clock news reported Sinclair and her 
counsel arguing motion for new triaL Film shown, 
coverage lasting one minute thirty seconds. On 
June 5, film coverage on the 6 o'clcck news Jasti;cq 
one minute reported the sentencing of Miss Sinclair; 
10 o'clock news had one minute ten seconds cov-
erage with film. 
Newspaper coverage commenced the first d:i;' 
of the trial. Both the Salt Lake Tribune and the Des· 
eret News reported day-by-day the testimony pre 
sented during the trial. Coverage was also given to 
the jury verdict and the sentence of the court 
The record is devoid of what instructions the 
trial court gave the jury with respect to the juro1~' 
wading newspapers, listening to radio commen 
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laries or viewing television. We must assume, 
thsrefore, that the impartiality of the jury remained 
during the course of the trial, that the trial judge 
'Nas correct in denying appellant's motion for mis-
trial when a copy of a magazine (P-7) had been 
found in the courtroom. 
Questions asked the jurors on voir dire exam-
inaJi on regarding their knowledge of the case or 
their contact with any pretrial publicity are not part 
of the record. Again it must be presumed that some 
measure of discretion must be held to reside in the 
tr~c'll iudge in determining which of the panel were 
competent to serve as jurors. We must also pre-
sume that the appellant, represented by able trial 
cmmsel, was satisfied with the panel ultimately 
SE' 1 scted and sworn. 
Since the record is not before us, we ml~st 
dgain presume that the jurors sworn to serve were 
duly and properly instructed by the court, that the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-28 (1953) were 
complied with requiring the court to admonish the 
jury regarding conversations among themselves 
or with others on any subject connected with the 
trial, and not to form or express any opinion thereon 
until the case was submitted to them. 
There is no evidence before this court that any 
iu1or d1sobeyed any instruction of the trial court. 
Nor is there any evidence that the jury, or any mem-
be>r thereof, came into contact with any publicity 
c onceming the trial that could in any way be 
deemed "prejudicial." Quite the contrary, at the 
20 .~ 
he,1r'1ng on appellant's petition, the appellant pro-
duced testimony for one juror that he was not famil-
iar with any story involving the appellant appear-
ing in a magazine entitled Startling Detective (~-7 
not admitted); that the first time he saw that maaa-
zine was at 1 :30 p.m. on the day of the hearing (R-
137). Nor did he hear any conversation at cill re-
garding homosexuality (R-136). He stated he did not 
hear the word "homosexuality" from any spectator 
while he was going to and from the courtroom (R-
136). 
The record is devoid of any evidence that there 
was any misconduct on the part of the spectators 
which may have influenced the jury. In fact, the 
appellant's witness ElRoy Nielson said that he had 
attended part of the trial, that he did not see a copy 
of plaintiff's Exhibit 7 while he was in attendance, 
nor did he overhear any conversation regarding 
homosexuality made in the presence of jurors (R-138). 
Appellant has not demonstrated sufficiently that 
pretrial publicity and publicity during the trial were 
of such a nature as to require the trial court to dis-
regard the jurors' statements of impartiality on voir 
dire examination. 
The basic problem involving pretrial publicity 
is whether individual jurors who have seen or heard 
such publicity fulfill the constitutional standard of 
impcffliality. Where a juror has been exposed to pre 
tria.l n11blicity, but asserts that he is impartial, it hc1~ 
been held adequate and not prejudicial to the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. See for example Stroble 
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v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 96 L.Ed. 872, 72 S.Ct. 599 
(1952). 
In the case of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879), although not indicating that 
the views of the juror in question were based on 
pretrial publicity, the court there stated: 
In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal 
education, every case of public interest is almost, 
as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention 
of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and 
scarcely any one can be found among those best 
fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, 
and who has not some impression or some opinion 
in respect to its merits. 
See also Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 30 L.Ed. 709 
(1887), wherein the court holds that the judgment of 
the trial court as to the competency of the juror upon 
his declaration under oath or otherwise is con-
clusive wherein the juror in question testified that 
he had heard of the case through the newspapers, 
read what was represented to be the evidence, and 
talked about it since that time, but he did not think 
he had ever expressed an opinion on the case, that 
he was not conscious of any bias or prejudice that 
might prevent him from dealing with the defendant 
impartially, and that he thought he could try the 
case according to the law and the evidence given 
in court. 
See also Theide v. Utah, 159 U.S. 510, 40 L.Ed. 
237 (1895), wherein the Supreme Court denied a 
challenge for cause of a juror who testified on his 
voir dire that he had read an account in a locnl 
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newspaper of the homicide with which the de-
fendant was accused, had formed some impression 
touching it, which he could lay aside, and could 
try the case fairly and impartially on the evidence. 
See also annotation Juror Reading Newspaper, 3 
L.Ed. 2d 1250, and annotation Juror Reading News-
paper, 31 A.LR. 2d 417. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently 
expressed the opinion that: 
It is not required, however, that the jurors be 
totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. 
In these days of swift widespread and diverse meth-
ods of communication, an important case can be 
expected to arouse the interest of the public in the 
vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to 
serve as jurors will not have formed some impres-
sion or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is 
particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the 
mere existence of any pre-conceived notion as to the 
guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is 
sufficient to rebuke the presumption of a prospec-
tive juror's impartiality would be to establish an 
impossible standard. It is sufficient the juror can 
lay aside his impression or opinion and render a 
verdict based on the evidence presented in court. 
Irvin v. Dowd, op. cit. 
Recent decisions wherein the defendant was 
held not to have been denied a fair trial by reason 
of pretrial publicity as alleged by defendant in-
clude United States ex rel., Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 
454, 100 L.Ed. 1331, 76 S.Ct. 965 (1956); Latham v. 
Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963). A thorough ac· 
count of recent decisions including the manner of ' 
the alleged "prejudicial" pretrial publicity in each 
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case is contained in an annotation entitled Pretrial 
Publicity-Fair Trial. 10 L.Ed. 2d 1243, § 4 (C), page 
1255. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 
8 L.Ed. 2d 98, 82 S.Ct. 955, reh. den. 370 U.S. 965, 
8 L.Ed. 2d 834, 82 S.Ct. 1575, (1962), and Reizzo v. 
United States, 304 F.2d 810, (8th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 
371 U.S. 890, 9 L.Ed. 2d 123, 83 S. Ct. 188 (1962). 
In the case of United States v. Synodinos, 218 F. 
Supp. 479 (DC Utah 1963), the court denied a motion 
for a change of venue on the ground of pretrial 
publicity in an action involving interstate transmis-
sion of wagering information. Claiming substantial 
newspaper, radio, and television publicity constitut-
ing prejudice to the defendants, the court held that 
the newspaper accounts were merely an objective 
reporting of the court record. 
As stated in the annotation, Pretrial Publicity-
Fair Trial. op. cit, the decisions holding that a de-
fendant was deprived of a fair trial as a result of 
pretrial publicity have been far outnumbered by 
those holding that the defendant was not deprived 
of a fair trial, citing a collection of cases commenc-
ing at page 1251. The annotation further compiles 
cases involving pretrial publicity wherein the alle-
gation of the defendant regarding pretrial publicity 
had not been sustained, and also the failure of the 
r1efendant to seek certain forms of relief. 
In those instances wherein the defendant has 
sought reversal of a conviction or has sought a writ 
of habeas corpus on the general ground that pre-
trial publicity deprived him of a fair trial, or where 
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he has alleged that it was error to deny a motion for 
change of venue or continuance, or challenges to 
jurors involving pretrial publicity, the allegations 
of the defendant have generally not been sustained. 
For example, in affirming convictions despite claim3 
of prejudicial pretrial publicity, the courts have re-
ferred to the failure of the defendant to (1) seek a 
change of venue, (2) seek a continuance, (3) avail 
himself of the opportunity to ask jurors such ques-
tions as might reveal whether they were influenced 
by pretrial publicity, (4) exhaust his challenges, 
(5) challenge individual jurors for cause, (6) chal-
lenge the whole jury panel, or, (7) raise the issue of 
pretrial publicity until after he was convicted. Sim-
ilarily, the courts have rejected the defendant's 
claim that he was prejudiced by pretrial publicity 
where he either has selected to be tried without jury 
or hcts expressed his satisfaction with the members 
c,£ the jury. See cases cited in annotation Pretrial 
Publicity-Fair Trial, op. cit. 
It is well settled that the petitioner in a habeas 
corpus proceeding has the burden of proving the 
grounds on which he relies for his release by evi-
dence that is clear and convincing. See Workman 
v. Turner, ______ Utah 2d ________ , 425 P.2d 402, (1967), Mc· 
Guffey v. Turner, ________ Utah 2d ________ , 423 P.2d 166 
(1967), Beck v. Washington, op. cit. 
Respondent submits that appellant has failed to 
prove any grounds upon which release can be 
granted, and further, the evidence adduced by ap-
pellant at the hearing was less than clear and con-
vincing. Moreover, respondent submits that the rec-
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ord discloses no publicity either in the pretrial stage 
or during the trial which could be considered to be 
a clear and convincing proof of prejudice and un-
fair trial. 
Respondent submits the totality of the circum-
stances indicate that the appellant was afforded a 
fair trial. Admittedly, there was publicity, but it 
lacked the animadversion which, respondent sub-
mits, is necessary to constitute prejudice to appel-
lant. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
any of the jurors vvere in any way influenced by 
either pretrial publicity or news accounts during 
the trial. Quite the contrary. Although it can be 
established that the Don Foster murder and the sub-
sequent arrest 01 Jean Sinclair did command a sub-
sta_ntial amount of publicity from the various news 
rnedia within Salt Lake County, it cannot be said 
that such publicity was prejudicial. 
In no instance in the Sinclair case do we find 
any type of publicity similar to that which occurred 
in Sheppard v. Maxwell, op, cit., wherein front page 
headlines announced "testify now in death, Bay 
doctor is ordered", "Doctor balks at lie test; retells 
story". "Kerr (Captain of Cleveland police) urges 
Sheppard's arrest"; nor do we have editorial bom-
bardment with front page charges that somebody 
is "getting away with murder". In no instance were 
any of the proceedings in the Sinclair case tele-
vised, as in the Sheppard case in which the coro-
nen3 inquest was televised in a school gymnasium, 
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or the in the Estes case. Nor did the press sta_m-
pede the law enforcement agencies and prosecutors 
into arresting and charging Sinclair with the mur-
der of Foster a_s occurred with Sheppard for the 
murder of his wife with such headlines as "Why 
Don't Police Quiz Top Suspect", "Why Isn't Sam 
Sheppard in Jail", and "Quit Stalling-Bring Him 
In". 
The Sinclair case did not attract journalists and 
ne~Ns commentators of national prominence as did 
the Sheppa_rd case, nor did we have the printing 
0£ indiivdual pictures of prospective jurors in the 
local newspapers. 
There is great disimilarity between the Sinclair 
case and the Sheppard case. In the Sinclair case no 
local nev11spaper featured the home life of an alter-
nate juror, nor were the jurors separated into two 
groups to pose for photographs which appeared 
tn newspapers, taken while the jury was sequest-
ered. In S1nclair we have no radio broadcasts of 
debates staged by newspaper reporters in which 
Sinclair's counsel was accused of throwing road 
blocks in the way of the prosecution. Nor do we , 
have reports in any news media of testimony not 
produced at trial or evidence not produced at trial. 
Respondent submits that the "totality of cir-
cumstances" in the Estes and Sheppard cases are 
totally different than what occurred during the Sin-
cla_ir case. 
In commenting on the obvious abuses that oc-
curred in the Sheppard trial, the Supreme Court ir1-
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dic:i.ted that the trial court might well have pro-
scribed extra-judicial statements by any lawyer, 
oarty, witness, or court official which involves preju-
dicial matters such as the refusal of Sheppard to 
submit to interrogation or take any lie detector tests; 
any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the 
idenity of prospective witnesses or their probable 
testimonies; any belief in guilt or innocence; or 
like statements concerning the merits of the case, 
citing State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 
841, 850 (1964), in which the court interpreted Canon 
20 of the American Bar Association's Canons of 
Professional Ethics to prohibit such statements. The 
Supreme Court further stated that the trial court, be-
lng advised of potential prejudicial impact of pub-
licity, could have requested the appropriate city ar..d 
county officials to promulgate a regulation with re-
spect to dissemination of information about the case 
by their employees. Also, that reporters who wrote 
or broadcast prejudicial stories could have been 
warned as to the impropriety of publishing material 
not introduced in the proceedings. 
Again, a comparison of the Sinclair and Shep-
p::nd cases in light of the suggestions of the United 
States Supreme Court is warranted. In no instance 
in the Sinclair case does the record reflect any pub-
Jlcation of prejudicial matter with regard to interro-
gation of Sinclair or lie detector tests, any statement 
made by Sinclair to officials, the identity of prospec-
tive witnesses or their probable testimony, any be-
lief in guilt or innocence or like statements concern-
ing the merits of the case. Nor is there any evidence 
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of potcmtia_l or real prejudicial impact of publicity 
with respect to dissemination of information by pub-
lic employees. 
Examining now the alleged disruptive influ-
ences in the courtroom during appellant's trial, the 
bailiff testified that he had no difficulty in controlling 
the crowd in the courtroom (R-101), that the spec-
tators were quiet in the courtroom (R-102), and that 
to his knowledge there were no photographs of any 
kind taken during the course of the trial (R-100). 
None of the matters of which appellant claim'3 
1 
as disruptive were of such gravity as to require the 
court to discharge appellant. As a matter of fact, the 
court considered many of these complaints in the 
previous case of State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 
P.2d 465 (1964), wherein the court stated at 389 P.2d 
470: 
We have considered and find without merit various 
other claimed errors in rulings on evidence; and also 
a number of alleged improprieties in the conduct of 
the attorneys, witnesses, jurors, and spectators talk-
ing to each other, exchanging greetings, shaking 
hands, and a spectator soliciting autographs. Con-
sidering the fact that this trial attracted a great 
deal of public attention, and that it lasted for about 
three weeks, it would be strange indeed if some in-
cident short of perfect decorum had not occurred, 
particularly short of what defense counsel now de-
mands. It is agreed that some of the conduct com-
plained of may not have been exemplary, and that 
those involved in an official capacity in the trial 
should avoid any familiarity beyond discreet and re-
served civility with the parties, witnesses and 
jurors. 
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Under our statute, which requires that errors which 
do not effect the essential rights of the parties be 
disregarded, we could not properly interfere with 
the jury's verdict unless upon review of the whole 
case it should appear that there was error of suffi-
cient gravity that the defendant's right were preju-
diced in some substantial way. We have found noth-
ing of any such consequence here. (Citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), and State v. Siddoway, 61 
Utah 189, 211 P. 968 (1922). 
Respondent is not unmindful of many situations 
where pretrial publicity or publicity during the trial 
have resulted in unfair trials and have deprived the 
accused of a fair trial, e.g. Estes v. Texas, op. cit. 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, op. cit. However, the respond-
ent submits there are many contributions the news 
media can make during a trial. As stated in Fair Trial 
and Free Press, American Bar Association Institute 
of Judicial Administration Project on Minimum 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Paul C. Reardon. 
Chairman, 1966, P. 50: 
During the trial, there are several important contri-
butions the news media can make. First, informed 
and intelligent reporting can educate the public-
many of whom have never been in a courtroom-
on the workings of the criminal process. Second, 
such reporting can help to insure that the conduct 
of those who participate in the trial-judges, law-
yers, and witnesses-live up to the standards that 
our system of justice demands. Finally, as in the 
case of reports of arrests and requests for evidenct:, 
reporting of the trial may evoke evidence that will 
aid in convicting or exonerating the accused. 
Many proposals have been made by different 
hodies, many debates have been held, and many 
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recommendations have been heard dealing with 
the problem. These recommendations include addi-
tional legislation giving the courts increased con-
tempt powers, modifications and revisions of the 
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar 
Association, and regulations and departmental 
rules affecting law enforcement agencies. See Fair 
Trial and Free Press, Reardon, op. cit., pp. 2-15. See 
also Report of Symposium, Free Trial-Free Press, 
J"Jew York State Bar Association (1966), reprinted m 
Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 2 No. 3, (1966). For views 
of the news media regarding censorship of criminal 
proceedings, see reprint of speech of Clifton Daniel, 
managing editor, New York Times. printed in 
Journal ofthe National District Attorneys Association. 
Vol. 1, No. 2, (1965). 
It was stated in the Interim Report of the Special 
Committee on Radio and Television of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York. Harold R. 
Medina, Chairman, Columbia University Press, 1965, 
at page 272: 
The problem of free press versus fair trial is not n 
new one. The last seventy years have witnessed 
many unsuccessful attempts on the part of the news 
media and bar representatives to formulate a satis-
factory code of principles that would govern the 
conduct of members of both professions. 
Commenting on what controls should be placed 
on police, lawyers, and the press by the courts, a. 
special committee of the Bar of New in its final re-
port entitled Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial. op. 
cit., had the following comment: 
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As usual there is, on the one hand, the question of 
power or jurisdiction, and, on the other hand, the 
question of policy. Moreover, one cannot consider 
the two questions in vacuo. They must be discussed 
in relation to the groups of persons who would be 
affected by the control of prejudicial publicity. Thus, 
starting with the commission of the crime or the 
arrest of the accused, or the filing of the indictment 
or the information, and continuing up to the time 
of the trial or thereabouts, it is a serious question, 
both of power and publicity, whether the court in 
which the case is to be tried, or any courts, should, 
by rule of court, by authority of legislative enact-
ment, or by virtue of some competence supposed to 
be inherent in the judicial function, have the right, 
vis-a-vis, lawyers, members of the police force, or 
representatives of the press, to proscribe to the pub-
lication or utterance of matters deemed prejudicial 
to the right of the accused to a fair trial. If such 
right exists, either actual or in ovo, then the judges, 
in this pretrial period, must have the power to fine 
and imprisonment for contempt of court all lawyers, 
members of the police force, and representatives of 
the press, who violate the orders of rules of pro-
scription. The prospect, in this pretrial period, of 
judges of various criminal courts of high and low 
degree, sitting as petty tyrants, handing down sen-
tences of fine and imprisonment for contempt of 
court against lawyers, policemen, and reporters and 
editors, is not attractive. Such an innovation might 
well cut prejudicial publicity to a minimum. But at 
what a price! (P. 39) 
Concluding that such controls are unwise, the 
report continued at page 40: 
Nevertheless, with respect to the police and the 
press in the entire pretrial period we think it un-
wise and detrimental to the public interest to give 
such contempt powers to the comts and the judges. 
Moreover, we think that such proceedings and court 
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rules, legislation or whatnot else authorizing such 
contempt proceedings might well be held to be a 
violation of the first amendment guarantees of free 
press and free speech. Furthermore, as to the police, 
we find no authority inherent in the courts or the 
judges to discipline them for alleged breach of their 
duties as police officers. 
The First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution provides: 
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press ... . 
This provision of the First Amendment has been 
made applicable to the states through the due pro-
cess clause. See Near v. Minnesota. 283, U.S. 697. 
707; 51 S.Ct. 625, 628 (1930). 
Yet the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend· 
ments assure the accused a fair trial. The problem of 
guaranteeing freedom of speech and press, while 
at the same time guaranteeing to the accused a fair 
trial is indeed difficult. Commenting on these con-
cepts the United States Supreme Court in the casG 
of Estes v. Texas. op. cit., held that Estes was de-
prived of his right under the Fourteenth Amend 
ment to due process by the televising and broad-
casting of his trial. In discussing the concepts re-
ferred to above, the court noted: 
The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awaken-
ing public interest in governmental affairs, exposing 
corruption among public officers and employees and 
generally informing the citizenry of public events 
and occurances, including court proceedings. While 
maximum must be allowed the press in carrying on 
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this i!llportant function in a democratic society, its 
exercise must necessarily be subject to the main-
tenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process. 
While the state and federal courts have differed over 
what spectators may be excluded from a criminal 
trial, 6 Wigmore, Evidence, section 1834 (3rd addi-
tion 1940) . . . . primary concern of all must be the 
proper administration of justice; that 'the life or 
liberty of any individual in this land should not be 
put in jeopardy because of actions of any news 
media'; 'the due process requirements in both the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the provi-
sions of the Sixth Amendment require a procedure 
that will assure a fair trial ... .' 
Continuing, the court stated, at page 541: 
It is true that the public has the right to be in-
formed as to what occurs in its courts, but reporters 
of all media, including television, are always present 
if they wish to be and are plainly free to report what-
ever occurs in open court through their respective 
media. This was settled in Bridges v. California, 314 
U.S. 252 86 L.Ed. 192, 62 S.Ct. 190, 159 A.L.R. 
1346 (1941), and Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 
391, 90 L.Ed. 1295, 66 S.Ct. 1209 (1946), which we 
reaffirm. These reportorial privileges of the press 
were stated years ago: 'The law, however, favors 
publicity in legal proceedings, so far as that object 
can be attained without injustice to the persons im-
mediately concerned. The public are permitted to 
attend nearly all judicial inquiries, and there ap-
pears to be no sufficient reason why they should 
not also be allowed to see in print the reports of 
trials, if they cannot have them presented as fully 
as they are exhibited in court, or at least all the ma-
terial portion of the proceedings impartially stated, 
so that one shall not, by means of them, derive er-
roneous impressions, which he would not have been 
likely to receive from hearing the trial itself.' 2 
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 931-932 (Car-
rington Edition 1927). 
3G 
The United States Supreme Court in Sheppard 
1 
v. Maxwell, op. cit., acknowledged that a responsi- · 
ble press has always been regarded as the "hand-
maiden of effective judicial administration, especial-
ly in the criminal field." The court further acknowl-
edged that it has: 
... been unwilling to place any direct limitation on 
the freedom traditionally exercised by the news 
media for 'what transpires in the courtroom is pub-
lic property.' 16 L.Ed. 2d at 613. 
Because of myriad views on prejudicial pub-
licity and the general subject of free press-fair trial, 
respondent is setting forth as an appendix to this 
brief certain recommendations, positions taken and 
views expressed by various Bar associations, the 
United States Department of Justice and certain writ-
ers, as an aid to this court in the event it should 
deem it advisable as part of the decision in this case 
to set down guidelines to be followed in the future 
by law enforcement personnel and agencies, prose-
cution and defense counsel, trial judges, and the 
news media. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from an analysis of the record in 
this case that the jury was not prejudiced by any 
publicity occurring prior to or during trial, nor was 
there any evidence of misconduct on the part of the 
jury. 
Appellant has failed to meet her burden of pro-
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ducing clear and convincing evidence of prejudice 
and unfair trial. 
Respondent submits that the totality of the cir-
cumstances do not show that appellant was not ac-
corded a fair trial. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the judc;-
ment of the District Court denying appellant's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WARREN M. WEGGELAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
39 
APPENDIX 
A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE GUID-
ANCE OF THE POLICE, PR.OSECUTING ATTORNEYS, 
DEFENSE COUNSEL, JUDGES, AND THE NEWS 
MEDIA WITH RESPECT TO CRIME NEWS RELEASES 
AND REPORTING. 
The following is a statement of principles for 
the guidance of the police, prosecuting attorneys, 
defense counsel, judges and the news media with 
respect to crime news releases and reporting.11 
The police, prosecuting attorneys, defense counsel, 
judges, and newsmen who have participated in this 
conference recognize their responsibilities to pro-
tect the right of an accused person to a fair trial. 
We believe that a proper balance can be maintained 
between freedom of the press and the right of an 
accused person to a fair trial by adherence to the 
following principles on the part of the police, prose-
cuting attorneys, defense counsel, judges, and news-
men: 
1. It is the responsibility of the police to in-
vestigate violations of the criminal law and to 
report their findings to the authority charged 
with the prosecution of criminal offenses. In 
disclosing to the news media the progress of a 
criminal investigation, the police should avoid 
speculation, theories, and conclusions which 
characterize any person in custody as guilty of 
the offense. 
2. Once a person is formally charged with a 
criminal offense, neither the prosecuting nor 
the defense counsel should make any state-
ment for publication purposes with respect to 
I/ Report of the Proceedings of a Conference on Prejudicial News Report-
ing in Criminal Cases, Free press - Fair trial, Northwestern University 
School of Law, Fred E. Inbau, editor, (1964). 
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the ;~nilt or innocence of the accused, or with 
resp2ct to the evidence eiihei' atto<nev n1av vie~v D.s supporting his side of the case. . . ·' 
Any violation of this obligation should be con-
sidered as unethical conduct and subject to ap-
propriate disciplinary actions by the organized 
bar or the courts. 
3. Judges should utilize all rernedies available 
undt:r the lav<' to insure that jurors arc not sub-
jected to outside influences and that they, in 
fact, are complying with the instructions and 
mandates of the court with respect to such in-
fluences. 
4. It is the responsibility of the free press to 
report the occurance of crime and the disposi-
tion of criminal offenders in the courts of this 
country. 
The day has long since passed when the average 
citizen can observe in person that justice is 
being administered in onr courts; the public 
must rely, therefore, upon the news media to 
report-promptly and accurately--the disposi-
tion of criminal cases in the courts. 
Diver;;ic'nt views prevent us from satisfactorily 
resolving the controversy as to ·whether it is a 
fact that news reporting can be so prejudicial 
as to actually interfere with an accused per-
son's right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, we are 
concerned with the trend of recent appellate 
court cases which seem to act upon that as-
sumption and thereb~' reverse the convictions 
of 2tCCused persons on the ground of prejudicial 
news reporting. 
It is the sense of this conference, therefore, that 
the news media, in reportin; crirne and th:: 
administration of criminal justice in this coun-
try, should refrain from the following prac-
tices: 
(a) Publicity which may result in a hos 
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tile atmosphere prejudicial to the accused 
at the time of his trial; 
(b) Over-emphasis upon the past crim-
inal record of an accused person in rela-
tion to the crime for which he has been on 
trial; 
(c) Detailed reporting of any statement 
labeled by the police or prosecution as a 
confession of guilt; 
( d) Reporting events at the trial which 
the court has, in accordance with long 
established rules of evidence, excluded 
from the consideration of the jury, and 
which are inflammatory or extraneous to 
the merits of the matter on trial that it 
would be decidedly unfair to the accused 
that the jury should learn of such matters 
through a news communication.2/ 
\VHAT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY? 
(Synopsis) 
Le Wine, What Constitutes Prejudicial Publici1y 
in Pending Cases, ABA Journal. Vol. 51, No. 10, Oct. 
1965. 
1. Publication of alleged confessions 
2. Publication of prior criminal convictions and 
conduct 
3. Inadmissable evidence in general 
4. Tangible evidence connecting the accused with 
the commission of the crime charged 
5. Evidentiary facts generally 
6. Matters excluded from evidence by the judge 
! The :ilatement of policy was not adopted by the conference. 
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7. Out of court statements of witrn~ssc~; 
8. Personal opinions ns to the guilt of the accused 
9. Comments on evidence introduced and the cred-
ibility of witnesses 
10. Inflammatory publicity and sensationalism 
tending to charge the community v:ith an emo-
tional atmosphere 
11. Articles relnting generally too. p2nding proceed-
ing bearing incidentally on the issues to be de-
cided 
12. Intimidation of jurors or matter intended to 
coerce or influence jurors by intimidation 
13. False or misleading reports of proceedings 
14. Publications affecting witnesses tending to in-
fluence or discourage their testimony 
MASSACHUSETTS 
The Introduction to the Massachusetts Guide for the 
Bar and News Media contains Articles I and VI of the 
Amendments to the United States Constitutions. It con· 
tinues: 
In an attempt to reconcile long-standing divergence of opinion 
as to the relative rights of the press and that of the individual 
to a fair trial, a special Massachusetts Bar-Press Committee 
was established in the fall of 1960. After two and a half years 
of study and discussion, the Committee, with the aid of ob-
servers from the judiciary, drafted a Guide which was approved 
by the Committee. Subsequently ratified by the four sponsor-
ing groups, the Guide was adopted by 26 daily and 31 weekly 
newspapers in the State. 
The Guide was approve<l in June, 1963, and has been 
adopted by the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations 
the Massachusetts Newspaper Information fa,rvicc, and the 
Massachusetts Broadcasters Association. The Guide reads: 
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Preamble 
1. To promote closer understanding between the bar and 
the press, especially in their efforts to reconcile the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of the press and the right to a fair, im-
partial trial, the following mutual and voluntary statement of 
principles is recommended to all members of both professions. 
2. Both professions, recognizing that freedom of the press 
is one of the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, agree that this 
fundamental freedom must be zealously preserved and respon-
sibly exercised subject only to those restrictions designed to 
safeguard equally fundamental rights of the individual. 
3. It is likewise agreed that both the press and the bar 
are obliged to preserve the principle of the presumption of inno-
cence for those accused of wrongdoing pending a finding of 
guilty. 
4. The press and the bar concur on the importance of the 
natural right of the members of an organized society to acquire 
and impart information about their common interests. 
5. It is further agreed, however, that the inherent right 
of society's members to impart and acquire information should 
be exercised with discretion at those times when public disclos-
ures would jeopardize the ends of justice, public security and 
other rights of individuals. 
6. The press and the bar recognize that there may arise 
circumstances in which disclosures of names of individuals in-
volved in matters coming to the attention of the general publi.:; 
would result in personal danger, harm to the reputation of a per-
son or persons or notoriety to an innocent third party. 
7. Consistent with the principles of this preamble, it is the 
responsibility of the bar, no less than that of the press to sup-
port the free flow of information. 
For the Press 
Newspapers in publishing accounts of crime should keri1 in 
mind that the accused may be tried a court of law. 
To preserve the individuals rights io a fair trial ,news 
3tories of crime should contain only a factual statement of the 
arrest and attending circumstances. 
The following should be avoided: 
1. Publication of interviews with subopenaed witnr:sses 
after an indictment is returne<l. 
2. Publication of the criminal record or discreditable act~ 
of the accused after an indictment is returned or during the trial 
unless made part of the e\'idence in the court record. The dr·· 
fendant is being tried on the charg·e for which is as accused ail(] 
not on his record. (Publication of a criminal record could be 
grounds for a libel suit.) 
3. Publication of coufrssions after an indictment is !\:· 
turned unless made a part of the evidence in the court record. 
4. Publication of testimony stricken by the court unless 
reported as having been stricken. 
5. Editorial comment preceding or during trial, tendin~ 
to influence judge or jury. 
6. Publication of names of .iuveniles involved in juveniie 
proceedings unless the names are released by the judge. 
7. The publication of any "leaks," statements or conclusions 
as to the innocence or guilt, implied or expressed, by the police 
or prosecuting authorities or defense counsel. 
For the Bar 
To preserve the individual's rights to a fair trial in a court 
of law the following guide lines arc prescribed for the Bar. 
1. A factual statement of the arrest and circumstances and 
incidents thereof of a person charged with a ci·ime is permis· 
sible, but the following should be avoided: 
(a) Statements or conc]u,;iom; as to the innocence or guilt. 
implied or expressed, by the prosecuting authorities or 
defense counsel. 
(b) Out-of-court statements by prosecutor;; 01· defense at-
torneys to news media in adva11ce of 01· during trial, 
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stating what they expect to prove, whom they propose 
to c.:al\ as witnesses or public criticism of either judge 
or jury. 
(cl Issuance by the prosecuting authorities, counsel for 
the defense or any person having official connection 
with the case of any statements relative to the con-
duct of the accused, statements, "confessions" or ad-
missions made by the accused or other matters bear-
ing on the issue to be tried. 
( d) Any other statement or press release to the news media 
in which the source of the statement remains un-
disclosed. 
9 At the same time, in the interest of fair and accurate 
reporting, news media have a right to expect the cooperation 0f 
the authorities in facilitating adequate coverage of the law en-
forcement process. 
It is to be noted that while the Guide was at first de-
signed for the bar and press, its provisions are by agreement 
made applicable to the broadcast news media. 
OREGON 
The Oregon Statement of Principles is the product of 
meetings and lengthy discussion periods held by the Ore~on­
Bar-Press-Broadcasters Joint Committee beginning in 
March, 1962. One month later, a final draft was completed 
and approved by the original committee. During the summer 
of 1962 the three groups involved gave approval to the code 
at their annual meetings, and the Statement of Principles 
was printed and distributed to all members of the Oregon 
State Bar, the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association, and 
the Oregon Association of Broadcasters. The text follows: 
Oregon Bar 
Press Broadcasters 
Joint Statement of Principles 
Oregon's Bill of Rights provides both for fair trials arid 
lot freedom of the press. These rights are basic and unqualified. 
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They are not ends in themselves but are necessary guarantors 
of freedom for the individual and the public's rights to be in-
formed. The necessity of preserving both the right to a fair 
trial and the freedom to disseminate the news is of concern to 
responsible members of the legal and journalistic professions and 
is of equal concern to the public. At times these two rightR 
appear to be in conflict with each other. 
In an effort to mitigate this conflict, the Oregon State Bar, 
the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association and the Oregon 
Association of Broadcasters have adopted the following state-
ment of principles to keep the public fully informed without 
violating the rights of any individual. 
1. The news media have the right and the responsibility 
to print and to broadcast the truth. 
2. However, the demands of accuracy and objectivity in 
news reporting should be balanced with the demands of fair 
play. The public has a right to be informed. The accused has the 
right to be judged in an atmosphere free from undue prejudice. 
3. Good taste should prevail in the selection, printing and 
broadcasting of the news. Morbid or sensational details of crim-
inal behavior should not be exploited. 
4. The right of decision about the news rests with the 
editor or news director. In the exercise of judgment he should 
consider that: 
(a) an accused person is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty; 
(b) readers and listeners are potential jurors; 
(c) no person's reputation should be injured needlessly. 
5. The public is entitled to know how justice is being ad-
ministered. However, it is unprofessional for any lawyer to ex-
ploit any medium of public information to enhance his side of a 
pending case. It follows that the public prosecutor should avoid 
taking unfair advantage of his position as an important source 
of news; this shall not be construed to limit his obligation to 
make available information to which the public is entitled. 
In recognition of these principles, the undersigned hereby 
testify to their continuing desire to achieve the best possible ac· 
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commoclation of the rights of the individual and the rights of 
1he public when these two fundamental precepts appear to be 
in conflict in the administration of justice. 
PART 1. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE 
CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
1.1 Revision of the Canons of Professional Ethics. 
It is recommneded that the Canons of Professional 
Ethics he revised to contain the following standards relat-
ing to public discussion of pending or imminent criminal 
litigation: 
It is the duty of the lawyer not to release or authorize 
the release of information or opinion for dissemination by 
means of public communications, in connection with pend-
ing or immiment criminal litigation with which he is as-
sociated, if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dis-
semination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise 
prejudice the due administration of justice. 
With respect to a grand jury or other pending investi-
gation of any criminal matter, a lawyer participating in 
the investigation shall refrain from making any extra-
judicial statement, for dissemination by any means of 
public communication, that goes beyond the public record 
01· that is not necessary to inform the public that the in-
vestigation is underway, to describe the general scope of 
the investigation, to obtain assistance in the apprehension 
of a suspect, to warn the public of any dangers, or other-
wise to aid in the investigation. 
From the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant, 
or the filing of a complaint, information, or indictment in 
any criminal matter until the commenc~ment of trial or 
disposition without trial, a lawyer associated with the 
prosecution or defense shall not release or authorize the 
releage of any extrajudicial statement, for dissemination 
by any means of public communication, relating to that 
matter and concerning: 
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, in· 
dictments, or other charges of crin:e), or the character ~ I , 
I 
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or reputation of the defendant, except that the lawyer 
may make a factual statement of the defendant's name 
age, residence, occupation, and family status, and if th~ 
defendant has not been apprehended, r:~ay release any 
information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to 
warn the public of any dangers he may present; 
(2) The existence or contents of any confession, ad-
mission, or statement given by the defendant, or the 
refusal or failure of the defendant to make any state. 
ment; 
(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or 
the defendant's refusal or failure to submit to an ex· 
amination or test; 
( 4) The identity testimony, or credibility of pros pee· 
tive witnesses, except that the lawyer may announce 
the identity of the victim if the announcement is not 
otherwise prohibited by law; 
( 5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense 
charged or a lesser offense; 
(6) The defendant's guilt or innocence or other mat· 
ters relating to the merits of the case or the evidence 
in the case, except that the lawyer may announce the 
circumstances of arrest, including time and place of 
arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons; may 
announce the identity of the investigating and arrest· 
ing officer or agency and the length of the investiga· 
tion; may make an announcement, at the time of the 
seizure, describing any evidence seized; may disclose 
the nature, substance, or text of the charge, including 
a brief description of the offense charged; may quote 
from or refer without commfmt to public records of the 
court in the case; may announce the scheduling or result 
of any stage in the judicial process; may request assist· 
ance in obtaining evidence; and, on behalf of his clien~, 
may announce without further comment that the ch· 
ent denies the charges made against him. 
During the trial of an:v criminal matter, including the 
period of selection of I he jury, no lawyer associated with 
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the prosecution or defense shall give or authorize any 
extrajudicial statement or interview, relating to the trial 
or the parties or issues in the trial, for dissemination by 
any means of public communication, except that the law-
yer may quote from or refer without comment to public 
records of the court in the case. 
After the completion of a trial or disposition without 
trial of any criminal matter, and while the matter is still 
pending in any court, a lawyer associated with the prose-
cution or defense shall refrain from making or authorizing 
any extrajudicial statement for dissemination by any 
means of public communication if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that such dissemination will affect judgment or 
sentence or otherwise prejudice the due administration of 
justice. 
Nothing in this Canon is intended to preclude the formu· 
lation or application of more restrictive rules relating to 
the release of information about juvenile or other offen-
ders, to preclude the holding of hearings by legislative, 
administrative, or investigative bodjes, or to preclude any 
lawyer from replying to charges of misconduct that are 
publicly made against him. 
1.2 Rule of court. 
In any jurisdiction in which Canons of Professional 
Ethics have not been adopted by statute or court rule, it 
is recommended that the ,;;ubstance of the foregoing section 
be adopted as a rule of court governing the conduct of at-
torneys. 
1.3 Enforcement. 
It is recommended that violation of the standards set 
forth in section 1.1 shall be grounds for judicial and bar 
association reprimand or for suspension from practice and, 
in more serious cases, for disham1ent or punishment for 
contempt of court. It is further recommended that any at-
torney or bar association be allowed to petition an appro-
priate court for the institution of contempt proceedings, 
and that the court have discretion to initiate such proceed-
ings, either on the basis of such a petition or on i~H O'.I Ll 
motion. 
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PART II. RECOM;\1ENDATIONS RELATING TO THE 
CONDUCT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AN!J 
JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES IN CRIMINAL CASES 
2.1 Rule of court relating to disclosures by law enforcement 
officers. 
It is recomm.Pnded that the following rule be promul-
gated in each jurisdiction by the appropriate court: 
Release of information by law enforcement officers. 
From th~ time of arrest, issuance of an arrest wanant, 
or filing of any complaint, information, or indictment in 
any criminal matter within the jurisdiction of this court, 
until the completion of trial or disposition without trial. 
no law enforcement officer sub.iect to the jurisdiction of 
this court shall release or authorize the release of any 
extrajudicial statement, for dissemination by any meam 
of public communication, relating to that matter and con· 
ceming: 
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, in· 
dictments, or other charges of crime), or the character 
or reputation of the defendant, except that the officer 
may make a factual statement of the defendant's name, 
age, residence, occupation, and family status, and if th~ 
defendant has not been apprehended, 1:r::iy release an) 
information necessary to aid in his apprehension or lo 
warn the public of any dangers he may present; 
(2) The existence or contents of any confession, ad· 
mission, or statement given by the defendant, or the 
refusal or failure of the defendant to make any state· 
ment; 
(3) 'I'he performance of any examinations or tests o-. 
the defendant's refusal or failure to submit to an ex· 
amination or test; 
( 4) The identity testirron:v, or credibility of prospec· 
tive witnesses, except that the officer may announce the 
identitv of the victim if the announcement is not other· 
wise p;ohibited by law; 
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( 5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense 
charged or a lesser offense; 
(6) The defendant's guilt or innocence, or other mat-
ters relating to the merits of the case or the evidence 
in the case, except that the officer may announce the 
circumstances of arr~st, including the time and place of 
arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons; may an-
nounce the identity of the investigating and arresting 
officer or agency and the length of the investigation; 
may make an announcement, at the time of the seizure, 
describing any evidence seized; may disclose the nature, 
substance, or text of the charge, including a brief de-
scription of the offense charged; may quote from or 
refer without comment to public records of the court 
in the case; may announce the scheduling or result of 
any stage in the .iudicial process; and may request as-
sistance in obtaining evidence. 
The court may, in its discretion, initiate proceedings for 
contempt for violation of this rule, either on its own mo-
tion or on the petition of any person. 
Nothing in this rule is intended to preclude any law 
enforcement officer for replying to charges of misconduct 
that are publicly made against him, to preclude any law 
enforcement authority from issuing rules not in conflict 
herewith on this or related subjects, to preclude any law 
enforcement officer from participating in any legislative, 
administrative, or investigative hearing, or to supersede 
any more restrictive, or investigative hearing, or to super-
sede any more restrictive rule governing the release of in· 
formation concerning juvenile or other offenders. 
For purposes of this rule, the term 'law enforcement 
officer' includes any person employed or retained by any 
governmental agency to assist in the investigation of crime 
or iri ·nre apprehension or prosecution of persons suspected 
of or charged with crime. 
2.2 Departmental rules. 
It is recommended that law enforcement authorities in 
each jurisdiction promulgate an internal regulation (1) 
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embodying the prohibitions of the preceding section and 
(2) directing that releases not prohibited by that section 
be withheld during the relevant period if the information 
would be highly prejudicial and if public disclosure would 
serve no significant law enforcement function. It is fur. 
ther recommended that such agencies adopt the following 
internal regulations: 
(a) A regulation governing the release of information, 
relating to the commission of crimes and to their investi· 
gation, prior to the making of an an arrest or the filing 
of formal charges. This regulation should establish ap· 
propriate procedures for the release of information. It 
should further provide that, when a crime is believed to 
have been committed, pertinent facts relating to the crime 
itself may be made available but the identity of a suspect 
prior to arrest and the details of investigative procedures 
shall not be disclosed except to the extent necessary to 
assist in the apprehension of the suspect, to warn the pub· 
lie of any dangers, or otherwise to aid in the investigation. 
(b) A regulation prohibiting (i) the deliberate posing 
of a person in custody for photographing or televising by 
representatives of the news media and (ii) the interview· 
ing by representatives of the news media of a person in 
custody unless he requests an interview in writing after 
being adequately informed of his right to consult with 
counsel. 
( c) A regulation providing for the enforcement of thP-
foregoing by the imposition of appropriate disciplinary 
sanctions. 
2.3 Rule of court relating to disclosures by judicial em· 
ployees. 
It is recommended that a rule of court be adopted in 
each jurisdiction prohibiting any judicial employee front 
disclosing, to any unauthorized person, information relat· 
ing to a pending criminal case that is not part of the pub· 
lie records of the court and that may tend to interfere 
with the right of the people or of the defendant to a fair 
trial. Particular reference should be made in this rule to 
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the nature and result of any argument or hearing held in 
chambers or otherwise outside the presence of the public 
and not yet available to the public under the standards in 
section 3.1 and section 3.5(d) of these recommendations. 
Appropriate discipline, including proceedings for contempt, 
should be provided for infractions of this rule. 
PART Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE 
CONDUCT OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 
3.1 Pretrial hearings. 
It is recommended that the following rule be adopted 
in each jurisdiction by the appropriate court: 
Motion to exclude public from all or part of pretricll 
hearing. 
In any preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pre-
trial hearing in a criminal case, including a motion to sup-
press evidence, the defendant may move that all or part 
of the hearing be held in chambers or otherwise closed to 
the public on the ground that dissemination of evidence 
or argument adduced at the hearing may disclose mat-
ters that will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and 
is therefore likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial 
by an impartial jury. The motion shall be granted unless 
the presiding officer determines that there is no substan-
tial likelihood of such interference. With the consent of 
the defendant, the presiding officer may take such action 
on his own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecu-
tion. Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial 
hearing is held in chambers or otherwise closed to the 
public, a complete record of the proceedings shall be kept 
and shall be made available to the public following the 
completion of trial or disposition of the case without trial. 
Nothing in this rule is intended to interfere with the power 
of the presiding officer in any pretrial hearing to caution 
those present that dissemination of certain information by 
any means of public communication may jeopardize the 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
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3.2 Change of venue or continuance. 
It is recommended that the following standards be 
adopted in each jurisdiction to govern the consideration and 
disposition of a motion in a criminal case for change of 
venue or continuance based on a claim of threatened in· 
terference with the right to a fair trial. 
(a) Who may request. 
Except as federal or state constitutional provisions oth· 
erwise require, a change of venue or continuance may be 
granted on motion of either the prosecution or the de· 
fense. 
(b) Methods of proof. 
In addition to the testimony or affidavits of individuals 
in the community, which shall not be required as a condi· 
tion to the granting of a motion for change of venue or con· 
tinuance, qualified public opinion surveys shall be ad· 
missible as well as other materials having probative value. 
( c) Standards for granting motion. 
A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be 
granted whenever it is determined that because of the dis· 
semination of potentially prejudicial material, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a 
fair trial cannot be had. This determination may be based 
on such evidence as qualified public opinion surveys are 
opinion testimony offered by individuals, or on the couri's 
own evaluation of the nature, frequency, and timing of 
the material involved. A showing of actual prejudice shall 
not he required. 
(d) Same; time of disposition. 
If a motion for change of venue or continuance is made 
prior to the impaneling of the jury, the motion shall be 
disposed of before impaneling. If such a motion is per· 
mitted to be made, or if reconsideration or review of a 
prior denial is sought, after the jury has been selected, the 
fact that a jury satisfying prevailing standards of accept· 
ability has been selected shall not be controlling if the 
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record shows that the criterion for the granting of relief 
set forth in subsection ( c) has been met. 
( e) Limitations; waiver. 
It shall not be a ground for denial of a change of venue 
that one such change has already been granted. The claim 
that the venue should have been changed or a continuance 
granted shall not be considered to have been waived by the 
waiver of the right to trial by jury or by the failure to ex-
ercise all available peremptory challenges. 
3.3 Waiver of jury. 
In those jurisdictions in which the defendant does not 
have an absolute right to waive a jury in a criminal case, 
it is recommended that the defendant be permitted to 
waive whenever it is determined that (I) the waiver has 
been knowlingly and voluntarily made, and (2) there is 
reason to believe that, as a result of the dissemination of 
potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is required to 
increase the likelihood of a fair trial. 
3.4 Selecting the jury. 
It is recommended that the following standards be 
adopted in each jurisdiction to govern the selection of a 
jury in those criminal cases in which questions of possible 
prejudice are raised. 
(a) Method of examination. 
Whenever there is believed to be a significant possibility 
that individual talesmen will be ineligible to serve because 
of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the exam-
ination of each juror with respect to his exposure shall 
take place outside the presence of other chosen and pros-
pective jurors. An accurate record of this examination 
shall be kept, by court reporter or tape recording when-
ever possible. The questioning shall be conducted for the 
purpose of determining what the prospective juror has read 
and heard about the case and how his exposure has af-
fected his attitude towards the trial, not to convince him 
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that he would be derelict in his duty if he could not cast 
aside any preconceptions he might have. 
(b) Standard of acceptability. 
Both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror's 
testimony as to his state of mind are relevant to the de· 
termination of acceptability. A prospective juror who 
states that he will be unable to overcome his preconcep· 
tions shall be subject to challenge for cause no matter how 
slight his exposure. If he has seen or heard and remembers 
information that will be developed in the course of trial, 
or that may be inadmissible but is not so prejudicial as w 
create a substantial risk that his judgment will be affected. 
his acceptability shall turn on whether his testimony as w 
impartiality is believed. If he admits to having formed an 
opinion, he shall be subject to challenge for cause unless 
the examination shows uniquivocally that he can be iw· 
partial. A prospective juror who has been exposed to and 
remembers reports of highly significant information, such 
as the existence or contents of a confession, or other in· 
criminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence, 
or substantial amounts of inflammatory material, shall be 
subject to challenge for cause without regard to his testi· 
mony as to his state of mind. 
( c) Sourc~ of the panel. 
Whenever it is determined that potentially prejudicial 
news coverage of a given criminal matter has been intense 
and has been concentrated primarily in a given locality 
in a state (or federal district), the court shall have author· 
ity to draw jurors from other localities in that state (or 
district). 
3.5 Conduct of the trial. 
It is recommended that the following standards hi 
adopted in each jurisdiction to govern the conduct of a 
criminal trial when problems relating to the dissemination 
of potentially prejudicial material are raised. 
(a) Use of the courtroom. 
Whenever appropriate in view of the notoriety of thr 
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case or the number or conduct of news media representa· 
tives present at any judicial proceeding, the court shall 
ensure the preservation of decorum by instructing those 
representatives and others as to the permissible use of 
the courtroom, the assignment of seats, and other matters 
that may affect the conduct of the proceeding. 
(b) Sequestration of jury. 
Either party shall be permitted to move for sequestra-
tion of the jury at the beginning of trial or at any time 
during the course of the trial, and, in appropriate circum-
stances, the court shall order sequestration on its own mo· 
tion. Sequestration shall be ordered if it is determined that 
the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such a 
nature that, in the absence of sequestration, highly preju-
dicial matters are likely to come to the attention of the 
jurors. Whenever sequestration is ordered, the court in ad-
vising the jury of the decision shall not disclose which 
party requested sequestration. 
( c) Cautioning parties and witnesses; insulating wit-
nesses. 
When appropriate in light of the issues in the case or 
the notoriety of the case, the court shall instruct parties 
and witnesses not to make extra.iudicial statements, relat-
ing to the case or the issues in the case, for dissemination 
by any means of public communication during the course 
of the trial. The court may also order sequestration of 
witnesses, prior to their appearance, when it appears like· 
ly that in the absence of sequestration they will be ex-
posed to extra-judicial reports that may influence their 
testimony. 
( d) Exclusion of the public from hearings or arguments 
outside the presence of the jury. 
If the jury is not sequestered, the defendant shall be 
permitted to move that the public be exclud:-d from any 
portion of the trial that takes place outside the presence 
of the jury on the ground that dissemination of evidence 
or argument adduced at the hearing is likely to intc:fcrc 
with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial 
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.iury. The motion shall be granted unless it is determined 
that there is no substantial likelihood of such interfer-
ence. With the consent of the defendant, the court may 
take such action on its own motion or at the suggestio~ 
of the prosecution. Whenever such action is taken, a com. 
plete record of the proceedings from which the public has 
been excluded shall be kept and shall be made available 
to the public following the completion of the trial. Noth. 
ing in this recommendation is intended to interfere with 
the power of the court, in connection with any hearing 
held outside the presence of the jury, to caution those 
present that dissemination of specified information by any 
means of public communication, prior to the rendering of 
the verdict, may jeopardize the right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury. 
( e) Cautioning jurors. 
In any case that appears likely to be of siginificanl 
public interest, an admonition in substantially the follow· 
ing form shall be given before the end of the first day if 
the jury is not sequestered. 
During the time you serve on this jury, there may appear in the 
newspapers or on radio or television reports concerning this case, 
and you may be tempted to read, listen to, or watch them. Please 
do not do so. Due process of law requires that the evidence to be 
considered by you in reaching your verdict meet certain standards 
-for example, a witness may testify about events he himseU 
has seen or heard but not about matters of which he was told 
by others. Also, witnesses must be sworn to tell the truth and 
must be subject to cross-examination. News reports about the 
case are not subject to these standards, and if You read, listen 
to, or watch these reports, you may be exposed to misleading. or 
inaccurate information which unduly favors one side and to which 
the other side is unable to respond. In fairness to both sides. 
therefore, it is essential that you comply with this instruction. 
If the process of selecting a jury is a lengthy one, such an 
admonition shall also be given to each juror as he is select· 
ed. At the end of each subsequent flay of the trial, and at 
other recess periods if the court deems necessary, an ad· 
monition in substantially the following form shall be given: 
For the reasons stated earlier in the trial, I must remind you 1101 
to read, listen to, or watch any news reports concerning this cw 
while you are serving on this jury. 
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(f) Questioning jurors about exposure to potentially 
prejudicial material in the course of the trial; standard 
for excusing a juror. 
If it is determined that material disseminated during 
the trial raises serious questions of possible prejudice, the 
court may on its own motion or shall on motion of either 
party question each juror, out of the presence of the oth-
ers, about his exposure to that material. The method of 
examination shall be the same as that recommended in 
section 3.4(a), above. The standard for excusing a juror 
who is challenged on the basis of such exposure shall be 
the same as the standard of acceptability recommended in 
section 3.4(b), above, except that a juror who has seen 
or heard reports of potentially prejudicial material shall 
be excused if the material in question would furnish 
grounds for a mistrial if referred to in the trial itself. 
3.6 Setting aside the verdict. 
It is recommended that, on motion of the defendant, a 
verdict of guilty in any criminal case be set aside and a 
new trial granted whenever, on the basis of competent evi-
dence, the court finds a substantial likelihood that the 
vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to 
an extrajudicial communication of any matter relating to 
the defendant or to the case itself that was not part of the 
trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury. 
Nothing in this recommendation is intended to affect the 
rule in any jurisdiction as to whether and in what circum-
stances a juror may impeach his own verdict or as to what 
other evidence is competent for that purpose. 
PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE 
EXERCISE OF THE CONTEMPT POWER 
4.1 Limited use of the contempt power. 
The use of the contempt power against persons who dis-
seminate information by means of public communication, 
or who make statements for dissemination, can in certain 
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circumstances raise grave constitutional questions. Apart 
from these questions, indiscriminate use of that power can 
cause unnecessary friction and stifle desirable discussion. 
On the other hand, it is essential that deliberate action 
constituting a serious threat to a fair trial not go un. 
punished and that valid court orders be obeyed. It is 
therefore recommended that the contempt power should 
be used only with considerable caution but should be ex-
ercised in at least the following instances, in addition to 
those specified in sections 1.3, 2.1, and 2.3, above: 
(a) Against a person who, knowing that a criminal 
trial by jury is in progress or that a jury is being select· 
ed for such a trial: 
(i) disseminates by any means of public communi· 
cation an extrajudicial statement relating to the de· 
fendant or to the issues in the case that goes beyond 
the public record of the court in the case, if the state· 
ment is reasonably calculated to affect the outcome of 
the trial and seriously threatens to have such an effect; 
or 
(ii) makes such a statement with the expectation 
that it will be so disseminated. 
(b) Against a person who knowingly violates a valid 
judicial order not to disseminate until completion of the 
trial or disposition without trial, specified information 
referred to in the course of a judicial hearing from which 
the public is excluded under sections 3.1 or 3.5 ( d) of these 
recommendations. 
4.2 Reimbursement of defendant. 
In the event that a mistrial or change of venue is granted 
or a conviction set aside, as a result of an extrajudicial 
statement held to be in contempt of court, it is reco111· 
mended that the court have the authority to require that 
all or part of the proceeds of any fine be used to reimburse 
the defendant for the additional legal fees and other ex· 
penses fairly attributable to the order that the case be 
tried in a different venue or tried again in the same venue. 
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POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
On April 16, 1965, Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katz-
enbach issued the following policy statement governing per-
sonnel of the Department of Justice and the release by them 
of information in criminal proceedings to news media rep-
resentatives: 
The availability to news media of information in criminal 
cases is a matter which has become increasingly a subject of 
concern in the administration of criminal justice. The purpose 
of this statement is to formulate specific guidelines for the re-
lease of such information by personnel of the Deaprtment of 
Justice. 
While the release of information for the purpose of influ-
encing a trial is, of course, always improper, there are valid 
reasons for making available to the public information about 
the administration of the criminal laws. The task of striking a 
fair balance between the protection of individuals accused of 
crime and public understanding of the problems of controlling 
crime depends largely on the exercise of sound judgment by 
those responsible for administering the criminal laws and by 
representatives of the press and other media. 
Inasmuch as the Department of Justice has generally ful-
filled its responsibilities with awareness and understanding of 
the competing needs in this area, this statement, to a considerable 
extent, reflects and formalizes the standards to which represent-
atives of the Department have adhered in the past. Nonetheless, 
it will be helpful in ensuring uniformity of practice to set forth 
the following guidelines for all personnel of the Department 
of Justice. 
Because of the difficulty and importance of the questions 
they raise, it is felt that some portions of the matters covered 
by this statement, such as the authorization to make available 
federal conviction records and a description of items seized at 
the time of arrest, should be the subject of continuing review 
and consideration by the Department on the basis of experience 
aud suggestions from those within and outside the Department. 
1. These guidelines shall apply to the release .of informa-
tion to news media from the time a person is arrested or is 
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charged with a criminal offense until the proceeding has been 
terminated by trial or otherwise. 
2. At no time shall personnel of the Department of Justice 
furnish any statement or information for the purpose of in-
fluencing the outcome of a defendant's trial. 
3. Personnel of the Department of Justice, subject to spe-
cific limitations imposed by law or court rule or order, may make 
public the following information: 
(a) The defendant's name, age, residence, employment, mari-
tal status, and similar background information. 
(b) The substance or text of the charge, such as a com-
plaint, indictment, or information. 
(c) The identity of the investigating and arresting agency 
and the length of the investigation. 
( d) The circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest, 
including the time and place of arrest, resistance, pu1·· r 
suit, possession and use of weapons, and a description 
of items seized at the time of arrest. 
Disclosures should include only incontrovertible, factual mat- i 
ters, and should not include subjective observations. In addi- I 
tion, where background information or information relating to 
the circumstances of an arrest would be highly prejudicial and 
where the release thereof would serve no law enforcement func-
tion, such information should not be made public. 
4. Personnel of the Department shall not volunteer for 
publication any information concerning a defendant's prior crim· 
inal record. However, this is not intended to alter the Depart-
ment's present policy that, since federal criminal conviction rec· 
ords are matters of public record permanently maintained in 
the Department, this information may be made available upon 
specific inquiry. 
5. Because of the particular danger of prejudice resulting 
from statements in the period approaching and during trial. 
they ought strenuously to be avoided during that period. An)' 
such statement or release shall be made only on the infrequent 
occasion when circumstances absolutely demand a disclosure of 
63 
information and shall include only information which is clearly 
not prejudicial. 
6. The release of certain types of information generally 
tends to create dangers of prejudice without serving a significant 
law enforcement function. Therefore, personnel of the Department 
should refrain from making available the following: 
(a) Observations about a defendant's character. 
(b) Statements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attribut-
able to a defendant. 
( c) References to investigative procedures, such as finger-
prints, polygraph examinations, ballistic tests, or lab-
oratory tests. 
( d) Statements concerning the identity, credibility, or testi-
mony of prospective witnesses. 
(e) Statements concerning evidence or argument in the 
case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evi-
dence or argument will be used at trial. 
7. Personnel of the Department of Justice should take no 
action tn encourage or assist news media in photographing or 
televising a defendant or accused person being held or trans·· 
portPd in federal custody. Departmental representatives should 
not make available photographs of a defendant unless a law 
enforcement function is served thereby. 
8. This statement of policy is not intended to restrict the 
release of information concerning a defendant who is a fugitive 
from justice. 
9. Since the purpose of this statement is to set forth gen-
erally applicable guidelines, there will, of course, be situations 
in which it will limit release of information which would not be 
prejudicial under the particular circumstances. If a representa-
tive of the Department believes that in the interest of the fair 
administration of justice and the law enforcement process in-
formation beyond these guidelines should be released in a partic-
ul~r case, he shall request the permission of the Attorney Gen-
t·rril or the Deputy Attorney General to do so. 
